

Admiral Kurt W. Tidd
Presentation
IFPA-Fletcher Conference

ADMIRAL KURT W. TIDD: Good afternoon. Bearing in mind that I'm the last person standing between all of you and lunch, I'm going to fly through this. That's facilitated by the fact that I follow two good friends and colleagues, Bill Loeffler and Vayl Oxford, who have covered this topic in some detail. I'd like to spend a little bit of time, though, talking at the kind of grand strategic level of this problem, this nexus between WMD and terrorism and the security challenges that that poses. And then spend just a little bit of time touching on where I think as we develop this new maritime strategy, how that will be applicable to helping us deal with that problem.

First off, I'm assuming that we are all well beyond the point where anyone is contesting the validity of the fact that we have a threat, that we have a problem with terrorists who, in fact, are in the act of trying to get their hands on WMD. They have openly declared their intention to develop and to use WMD against us, against our allies, against our partners, and against the deployed forces and our interests around the world. Now, we've seen what happened previously when we did not take our adversaries at their word, and so I think it behooves us all to believe them when they tell us that they have declared their commitment to develop these weapons. This capability that they're building the rationale to actually legitimize its use, and their dedicating the people, equipment and leadership that are required in order to use them. So there's a serious threat out there.

In return, we have taken aggressive efforts to deny terrorists access to the WMD-related materials, to the equipment that's required to produce a weapon and to the expertise that's required to develop it. However, we have to enhance these efforts; we have to continue these activities in order to stay ahead of this dynamic and evolving threat.

We will continue to pursue the senior leaders of the terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, that have committed resources to the WMD capability. That part hasn't changed, and it

will not change. We'll continue a broad range of activities that are required to identify, to stress, to disrupt and to counter the networks of these suspected terrorist threats. At the same time, we must expand the counterproliferation and the nonproliferation efforts aimed at denying terrorists access to these weapons and to the weapons usable material. And Bill Loeffler talked at some length about the efforts that are ongoing in that field. And we will continue with our clear diplomatic campaign that enhances deterrence and that builds on a global alliance against WMD terrorism.

Now, I have to tell you, for me as we were addressing this WMD terrorism issue, I had a little bit of an aha moment. Now, it may be intuitively obvious to most of you out there, but I see a lot of uniforms and see an awful lot of retired shipmates, so I suspect that maybe it'll come as a surprise to you, but when we started looking at bringing together this very, very specialized community called the counterproliferation community and then this very specialized community called the counterterrorism community, they looked at the world through fundamentally different prisms. And so to bring them together required us to recognize there are some differences out there. But they also, by using these two different perspectives, were able to leverage the strengths that they bring.

In the counterterrorism world, we track people. We use forensics, we track finances, terrorist WMD capabilities are unknown, but their intent is well known. So that's from the CT side of things. When we look at it from the CP side, the counterproliferation side, counterproliferation programs typically track state programs. They look at networks, they look at transfers of things, as opposed to people or transfers of money, and they focus on assessing a state's capabilities. We've got a pretty good idea of understanding what a state's capabilities—Well, I say that with some reservation, but we focus a lot of effort on understanding state capabilities. It's state-specific intents that are largely unknown, so two different sides of the problem. But by blending these two communities together, it allows us to increase our knowledge of the enemy that we're looking at, to include the personnel that are involved in it, their facilities, the procurement shipping pattern, those sorts of infrastructure that are required to make this happen. This nexus between legitimate and illegitimate commerce that is at the heart of the movement of

much of the materials. Production, storage, weapons and targets, and then the testing, training and financing of the processes.

Now, when we think about state WMD programs, we generally have programs that have militarily specific goals. They spend a significant amount of time and funding on the research and development end of the weapons program, and they have large amounts of personnel and infrastructure and they seek to cause mass casualties. By comparison, most of the known or suspected terrorist WMD programs typically have limited funding, very few operatives relative to a state program and they take an opportunistic approach to the development and employment of their capabilities. So again, two different sides of things. Bringing them together allows us, finally, to really address this nexus between WMD and terrorism.

Very briefly, we put together a comprehensive approach to try to work this problem end to end and try to work it across all of the elements of national power. You hear us talk about that time and time again, but it really does. It involves the military end of things; it involves the intelligence community, the law enforcement end of things. DHS has an enormous role to play. But there are six key objectives that we focus on.

First is to determine terrorists' intentions, their capabilities and their plans to develop and acquire WMD. You've got to know who's trying to get their hands on these things and go after the problem. Secondly, to deny terrorists the access to the materials, the expertise and the other enabling capabilities that is required to develop WMD. Thirdly, to deter terrorists from employing WMD, and now there's a little bit of received wisdom out there that says you can't deter a nondeterrable (sic) actor and the terrorists are nondeterrable actors. We would contest that. We would say that in fact if you look at the entire supply chain of what's required between the person, the state or the individuals who are facilitating the development of a weapon and the person who's going to actually employ that weapon, there's a long supply chain. Each individual or each element of that supply chain may be amenable to different types of deterrence strategies. Certainly not

the same way that we looked at the Cold War deterrence, but you've got to at least tackle this piece.

Fourth, we need to be able to detect and disrupt terrorist attempted movement of WMD related materials, weapons and personnel. That's obviously PSI, that tends to get most of the attention and draw most of the notice, but that's only one piece of the strategy.

Fifth, we need to be able to prevent and respond to an actual WMD terrorist attack; that deals with our capabilities to both render safe a device if located, and also the ability to work the consequence management piece.

And lastly, we need to be able to define the nature and source of any terrorist employed WMD device after the fact. So all six of those together, you have to point out there is no single silver bullet that's going to allow you to solve this problem. You've got to work every single one of them simultaneously. If you spend all of your time and effort and resources thinking that if you just work on one of them, you'll solve your problem, we think that you're going to come up short. So we've got to work all of them together simultaneously.

Okay, the implications for a maritime strategy. We think that—we've spent some time, and I think Bill covered very well, the applicability of maritime forces to working the counterproliferation piece, and specifically being able to pick up ships en route, shipments en route. I think it's very clear that we take a look at the employment, the utility of maritime forces to be able to build a coalition of countries that are interested and determined to do something about this problem. We've seen that these are skill sets that are well within the heart of the envelope of maritime forces and that there are a wide variety of countries that are interested in participating, in contributing to this effort and they're looking for the most useful way that they can contribute.

We have seen that building maritime coalitions, compared to other types of coalitions, is relatively easy. We all understand the maritime environment, we work together

frequently, and we've got a lot of experience and common procedures. We have found that our ability to bring together forces, whether it be off the Horn of Africa with task force 150, North Arabian Sea, operations in the Arabian Gulf, operations in the western Pacific, that we're able to bring these coalitions together. And every single country that makes a contribution makes a valuable contribution to the effort. They all have unique skill sets, understanding of the environment, things that we're working as we operate now in the Gulf of Guinea. We're understanding that every country has a valuable contribution. So maritime forces are uniquely suited to be able to build these coalitions and give countries an opportunity to participate and to be seen to be standing shoulder to shoulder in this unified effort to deal with this scourge.

Secondly, maritime forces are very well suited to be able to operate as a flexible node in this global information grid. Now, we talked a little bit earlier about the importance of being able to gather intelligence, gather information. Maritime forces, because of their persistence on scene, they are well suited to be able to conduct what I call maritime scouting. It's sea-based, overt, HUMINT collection, that querying of vessels, talking to masters, going on board ships and discussing what's going on in the environment, finding out what's normal, what's not normal. That allows us to understand at a much more profound level than what we would be able to do if we relied solely on technical means. So maritime forces, they live in the environment, they work in the environment, they work with the civilians whose profession is on the seas. And we found that being able to leverage those forces in a coherent manner in which we're trying to do right now with the maritime domain awareness program is well suited.

Lastly, I would say that maritime forces are very well suited to be able to indirectly affect what's going on in the operation. The analogy that I use is that our maritime forces out there in the environment are very much akin to beaters in a tiger hunt. People ask all the time, "You know, you've been doing boarding operations for a long period of time. You've yet to catch bin-Laden on one of these dhows that you've boarded, so what's the level of effectiveness?" And what I would observe is that when you think about what beaters in a tiger hunt do, if they do their job correctly, they will never see the tiger. But

if they don't do their job correctly, the guy who's got his finger on the trigger whose job it is to drill that tiger will never see the tiger, either. So the maritime forces are out there, they're interacting with the environment and they're forcing adversaries to take them into consideration and to act on them.

And with that, I think we're probably out of time and want to leave a little bit of time for some questions. Thank you very much for the opportunity to participate. [applause]

Q&A for the Entire Panel

DR. MARTEL: We have plenty of time for questions. I guess the following rules; keep the questions brief rather than longer. We can do more short questions than long questions. Second, please tell us who you are and where you're from. And I mention to the panel as well, use their judgment, but not everybody has to respond to every question. With that, we're open to questions. Yes, sir, in the back? And please wait for the microphone, thank you.

AUDIENCE: My name is Jadon Beans (?) of General Logistics. I was trying to get this question in earlier on some of the previous panels. Considering that we acknowledge the importance of the Malacca Straits for the international trade, and the panel had referred to the A. Q. Khan network which had used Malaysia as a platform, any comments on the importance of the Malaysian navy, considering their absence in the recent multilateral exercises in the Indian Ocean where you had the Australian navy, Indian navy, Japanese navy, and the U.S. navy and the Singapore navy? Thank you.

DR. MARTEL: Whoever would like to take that question, please?

RDML TIDD: Okay. [laughter] You know, I think that it's important to recognize that the Malaysian navy makes significant contributions to security in the Malacca Straits region; they've been working very, very closely with Indonesia and Singapore in order to

work that problem. I don't think the measure of effectiveness or the value of the contribution should be: "does every single force participate in every single opportunity to participate?" They're going to figure out where they can leverage best their capabilities, what their resources are, and then they're going to make decisions that are based, as all countries do, on what their interests are and where they can get the most return on the interests.

So I think that we recognize the value, and Admiral Mullen specifically recognized the utility there, and I think it's—What we're looking for, I think, in the development of this new maritime strategy, these global maritime partnerships, is to create the venues where every country that has maritime forces to contribute, and whether we call them navies, whether we call them Coast Guard, whether we call them anything else, the forces that have the ability to go where the security challenges are, whether those are very, very close into shore, out in economic zones or whether it's on the blue waters is really immaterial. It's creating the venues, the personal relationships, creating the trust and then the ability to operate together in a professional manner that's the important piece.

DR. MARTEL: Yes, sir?

AUDIENCE: Hello, Eric Kulisch, *American Shipper* magazine. Wanted to get back to Mr. Oxford's point about the protection—I guess he countered Mr. Flynn's point on protection of the Navy, using Coast Guard or homeland security assets to protect the Navy. You seem to suggest that you didn't agree with that. Wouldn't it be potentially better, or couldn't there be an argument that DOD should use some of its larger resources than what DHS has to provide that protection? And maybe Mr. Hormats wants to comment on prioritization here. And I guess the counter to that is if the Defense Department is protecting military assets here domestically and feel that's important, maybe we need more resources. Do we need more resources to protect critical private infrastructure as well?

MR. OXFORD: Let me address kind of two concerns, and Eric, I'd ask you to address one of those specific questions to either Admiral Salerno, who will speak later, or Admiral Eilan (?) when he talks about how well their assets are able to do these multiple jobs and how far stretched they are.

My point was we are looking at port security in a more holistic way. In this case, the ability to deal with the small vessel threat, we looked at the strategic value of San Diego and the Puget Sound as very critical areas, and we need to bring in the extended capacity that comes with the air and maritime security committees and the local law enforcement agencies that have marine operational capability so we're not drawing only on the Coast Guard assets, we get expanded capacity to do the detection and interdiction method. It isn't just a federal issue, we're not just protecting the naval port, and we're protecting the key civilian assets in those locations as well.

I think Steve was suggesting that maybe we're ignoring L.A./Long Beach, but there are other assets in L. A./Long Beach as well that are looking at port security more broadly there. Plus, he was trying to bring up some infrastructure protection issues that I think maybe go beyond the maritime.

DR. HORMATS: I'll just follow that up, the other part of the question. I think the issue in substantial measure is we're probably doing what we need to do with respect to the military. But a substantial portion of the funding required for dealing with the domestic infrastructure issues that Steve raised today, and has raised for the last several years, effectively so in my judgment, a lot of that money simply has not been forthcoming, as you doubtless know, because you follow these things. And therefore, I do think hardening the infrastructure, protecting parts of the infrastructure that don't necessarily relate to the Navy or the Coast Guard is important.

I mean, if you live in New York, the corridors you go up, the New Jersey turnpike right outside New York, you see all those chemical plants. Jon Corzine, who was a former colleague at Goldman, now governor, constantly makes the point that there are lots of

vulnerabilities there. I mean, they're right off the highway, chemical plants, and places to store fuel, very vulnerable. There are a lot of parts of this country that are still very vulnerable and do not get the kind of protection that's needed.

And the second point is the broader point, and the point I was trying to make earlier, that we have many common interests with other countries that are building their naval capability. This is really on the blue water side. And it strikes me that partnerships with countries like China and India and Japan who have a very keen interest in keeping the sea lanes open and avoiding disruption of energy supplies, partnerships with them would, first of all, avoid misunderstandings with them. And second, enhance our capability of dealing with some of these issues before they get to our shores. Because they have as much of an interest in avoiding disruptions in the sea lane as we do. Lots of countries want to make sure that there are enhanced capabilities of keeping these sea lanes open. So those kinds of partnerships will enable us to utilize more of our resources, perhaps, closer to home if we can cooperate with them more broadly. Because the interests are very similar. We all have an interest in open sea lanes, and they're going to put more of their resources into it, we probably are as well. So we could get a lot more effectiveness if we worked more closely with them.

MR. OXFORD: Let me add one thing to that. One of the reasons we chose both San Diego and the Puget Sound area was because of their proximity to both the Canadian border and the Mexican border. We looked at the number of small vessels that are cleared by U.S. customs on an annual basis. The Puget Sound area, sail Tacoma, they cleared—That's the number one port for clearing small vessels coming into that—Into any U.S. port, and San Diego is number six. So there's practical reason why we would worry about a threat coming through the small vessel channel and the number of small vessels that come into those ports on an annual basis as well.

DR. MARTEL: Yes, sir? And we'll work our way back here, great.

AUDIENCE: Good morning. I'm Captain Matt Feely from the Defense Logistics Agency. It seems to me that when we've been talking about deterrence, we've been using the term in the context of days past when the enemy was an identifiable state actor who could be held account. Now, of course, we see non-state actors emerging as a potential enemy, and I think that Rear Admiral Tidd mentioned that it is perhaps possible to deter those non-state actors through probing and perhaps attacking or addressing somehow the supply chains that may allow for a non-state actor to deliver some kind of weapon of mass destruction. I wonder if any of the panel members might want to expound upon the strategies that could be used to deter non-state actors. It seems to me that what Rear Admiral Tidd had suggested may be more disruption, appropriately termed disruption rather than deterrence. So I'd be interested to hear in any more detail of what we could do for non-state actors? Thank you.

ADMIRAL TIDD: I'll start off, and then I think everybody else may have something to contribute as well. Disruption is a separate—it's a different phase. What I'm talking about is dissuading all of those sorts of intermediaries involved in the supply chain; the gray marketer, the scientist who might be tempted to contribute his technical expertise, obviously a potential state supporter or facilitator who might be interested in turning a blind eye to the transshipment of goods, those sorts of things. So each one of them may be amenable to a particular dissuasion method or dissuasion message or a deterrence message.

Do I think that the guy at the far end who's actually got his finger on the button can be dissuaded from pressing that button if he has that opportunity? I think that's a different series of problems, and that's typically what we have focused on up to this point, is the apocalyptic actor, and can you deter him? Maybe not, but he's got to get his finger onto a button in the first place, and you've got to tackle every single element along the way to minimize his opportunity to ever get to that point of getting his finger on the button.

Mr. OXFORD: Let me add that our defensive strategy that is very much a layered strategy, starts with doing everything we can to secure nuclear and radiological material,

both overseas and domestically. So every layer that we enhance our protection value to will also serve as a deterrent. And we finished that with things like if you go to any of our southern border crossings right now, our ports of entry or our seaports where you see officers with canines, with guns, you see radiation portal systems, that layer is pretty well becoming secure. So there's a deterrent value to every one of those steps.

On top of that, the interagency has recently come together and we're moving out aggressively in what we call nuclear forensics and attribution, the ability to essentially fingerprint nuclear materials, both domestically and around the world, so that if it's ever used, we can quickly lay claim to where it came from and who the potential prosecutor of that potential attack. So the ability to defend and also attribute the attack, we think adds to an overall deterrence strategy that is much different than the ones we used in the past.

RDML LOEFFLER: If I could just comment on the deterrent piece as well, part of what I talked about was the proliferation of dual use technology, where it's very difficult to understand what the difference is between a baby milk factory or a biological weapons facility. That's becoming increasingly more challenging to determine. So the value of intelligence can't be overstated, as well as understanding intent. And the deterrence piece, almost all these facilities, even those used by terrorists, have to be aided and abetted, for lack of a better word, by a state actor. And so can you deter a terrorist? Well, perhaps that's a subject of debate. But there is a much greater opportunity to deter a state actor that would have to facilitate the transfer or production of those dual use facilities than a terrorist would.

And if I could, everybody seems to focus on nuclear and I certainly would not wish to demean the importance of the nuclear threat. However, chemical is still a very real issue and the one that truly scares me is the biological piece because we're addressing the issue, but that is one that is truly beyond the imagination as to the possible consequences of a biological event. Thank you.

DR. MARTEL: We have time for a couple more questions. Back left, please?

AUDIENCE: Commander Carl Forkner, I'm faculty at the Air War College. Looking at the topics here on interdependence of world markets and economies, threats and so forth, we've heard a lot of discussion about some of the most pervasive threats and the most important ones that we perceive and the most important economies with whom we deal. But much like the post Vietnam era, it seems the discussion, as we look at a global maritime strategy, seems virtually mute on Central and South America and we limit ourselves in the security strategy realm to thinking of the hemisphere only in terms of ourselves, Mexico and Canada. Over the last 15 years, some of the South American navy has added to their riverine and littoral expertise by demonstrating back blue water competency, or giving us blue water aspirations.

We have dissonant groups, non-state actors that have been pervasive within South America; we have a number of economic concerns that we are—With South America in terms of agriculture, energy, textiles and other things. Hugo Chavez not only has been more of an influence within South America, but has reached out globally to other leaders with likeminded ideologies and ideas of where they want to go in a non-supportive role as far as American and western values. And I just wonder why we continue to be somewhat mute on the hemispheric maritime security that should include Central and South America?

RDML TIDD: Thank you. Maybe none of us what to upstage Admiral Stavridis when he comes, but I think nobody is ignoring what's going on down there, and I would just observe the deployment of *U.S.N.S. Comfort* and the deployment of *H.S.V. Swift* as a prototype doing some experimental work, testing out this notion of global fleet stations in order to bring capacity building tools to be able to work closely and create those personal relationships with the various and sundry navies down there and to work the maritime security issues to better understand what their concerns are so that we can work together.

And I think that's just the beginning of what will be a process of working more closely together with them. At the same time, we've got a long history of working together in the

whole UNITAS series of exercises. So I don't think there's been an ignoring as much as perhaps just difficult to get space above the fold.

___: Can I just add one comment? The point about the *Comfort*, which reminds me— Governor Thompson, I think, has referred to, has talked about medical diplomacy. And it strikes me that one of the objectives of whomever's going to be President next is going to have to be to improve America's image in the world. Our reputation has suffered over the last several years, and I don't want to fix blame for that, it's bipartisan. But the fact is, we're going to need to do something about it, and probably one of the best ways of doing it is what Governor Thompson's called medical diplomacy, and the Navy has a wonderful capability with the *Hope* and the *Comfort* and their other ships. And we could do it with other parts of our armed services, as well as the civilian parts of our government.

This could be an enormously powerful initiative, dealing with all sorts of diseases, waterborne diseases, viral diseases, infectious diseases around the world. This could be a very powerful thing for our national security and helping in Latin America and Africa, which is another area that could benefit, and which we're increasingly dependent on, also, for oil and for natural resources. So this could be a very powerful new initiative, and the Navy really could be at the forefront of this initiative.

DR. MARTEL: We have time for one more question. Yes, sir?

AUDIENCE: I'm Michael Mendelson, Intelsat. Thank you, gentlemen, for a very interesting panel this morning. It sounds to me, from what I've been hearing, that both the armed services and the federal agencies are not only being asked to do more with less from a budgetary perspective, but also to step outside of some of their traditional roles and look at new, creative ways to counter threats and to address force projection. So going back to something that was mentioned in the first panel, I'd like to know the extent to which you are, and extent to which the current legal environment allows you to,

explore some creative public/private partnerships outside of the traditional defense industry? Thank you.

___: We're looking for the lawyer and we can't find one. [laughter]

___: Remember that next time for the next panel.

DR. MARTEL: I think that'll do it. I'd like all of you to join me in saying thank you very much to the panel this morning. [applause] I think this is the time to adjourn for lunch, and then we'll see you after lunch as well. Again, thank you.