

AIR, SPACE, AND CYBERSPACE POWER IN THE 21ST CENTURY
38th IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy

January 20 – 21, 2010

DAY TWO

**INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES:
DEVELOPING GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS
10:00 – 12:00 NOON**

Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis

DR. JACQUELYN DAVIS: -- As we continue to consider issues and opportunities relevant to future U.S. forces, and in particular USAF, planning, the question of our international relationships looms large. U.S. security relationships, particularly that of NATO, U.S. bilateral relationships with Israel, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Taiwan, and in the context of intensified efforts to strengthen the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, have long influenced U.S. strategic and operational planning. In the years to come, they are likely to become even more important as we and our allies face increasing defense planning constraints, whether they be in the form of budget contractions, forward operating base access, environmental considerations, or as a result of changing threat perspectives.

In Afghanistan, and before that in Iraq, the United States is operating and did operate closely with its principal allies. Through NATO and in the context of its bilateral relationships, notably with Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), the United States has fostered interoperability and combined training, concept development, and even (lately) forces rationalization to meet common objectives. The Obama Administration, as with its predecessors, regards alliance planning to be among

its top national security priorities, identifying security cooperation to be an essential element of its strategy and planning.

However, alliance relationships at best are never easy and to evoke echoes of Lord Palmerston's famous dictum that nations have no permanent allies; they only have permanent interests, it is important to note that our interests and those of our friends and allies may not always be symmetrical, opening the door to misunderstandings and even acrimony. To be sure, NATO, which celebrated its sixtieth anniversary last year, and the U.S.-Japan Security Relationship, which this year will be 50 years old are testimony to a remarkable achievement—that is that the United States and other democratically-minded states can and have worked together for the common good, while promoting their own, respective interests, for years, withstanding the test of time, changes in political leaderships, and the challenges brought about by differing security planning perspectives and national imperatives.

To be sure, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the emergence of new security threats and challenges—the non-state actor transnational terrorist threat, nuclear proliferation, and the emergence of cyber security issues to name just a few of the features of the post 9/11 security landscape—the strategic priorities of nations have changed and, with them, ideas about the uses of military forces, their relationship to other elements of power, and “partnership” with the United States. This Panel has been designed to explore such changing perspectives, while seeking to identify new opportunities for facilitating, enhancing, and/or leveraging Alliance relationships to benefit common interests and security planning requirements.

To do this we have assembled a Panel of Officials who can speak eloquently about these matters.

The United States has a handful of partners with which it shares strategic and operational intelligence, technology development and transfers, and on whom it relies for operational support in key regional theaters. These include three of the countries

represented here on this Panel today: Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Also included in a very special category of partner relationships is NATO—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which has been in place for some 60 years, and for the first time in its history is conducting military operations outside of Europe, in Afghanistan. Our U.S. investment in NATO has been and continues to be substantial, but increasingly, there are questions about the ongoing relevance of the Alliance—questions by Europeans who while valuing the Transatlantic tie also seek to build up Europe’s own security institutions, and by Americans who cite problems with ISAF in Afghanistan and who contend that NATO’s reliance on consensus decision-making in an Alliance of 28 nations makes it inherently unworkable and unable to act, or even to react, in a timely fashion.

Alternatively, there are those who suggest that with the new Strategic Concept exercise and NATO’s military transformation which thus far has resulted in HQs alignment and efficiencies and which tomorrow may result in new thinking about forces rationalization, basing, and manning concepts, the Alliance has not run its course and in fact is poised on the threshold of new accomplishments, especially in the development of a comprehensive approach to stability planning and with respect to force structure developments. We have two speakers here today who are part of the NATO organization, and who, I suspect, will offer an alternative analysis of the continuing promise of NATO, especially in the context of current efforts to update NATO’s Strategic Concept to identify and address current and emerging Security challenges.

Our first speaker of the day, **General Stephane Abriel** is very well positioned to speak to us about NATO transformation and air, space, and cyber issues. General Abriel, as you know, is the first non-American to hold a strategic command portfolio in NATO, that of SAC-T, and with ADM Jim Stavridis, has the responsibility to provide guidance to the SECGEN and the NAC with respect to all military issues and concerns of the Alliance. The bios for all speakers are contained in your conference brochures, but it is worth noting that General Abriel, previously served as his country’s Air Force Chief, was an

DR. DAVIS: Our final speaker this morning is a friend of mine and a special operator, a Special Forces member of the famous British SAS. As you know, one of the core mission taskings of Special Forces is to cultivate foreign relationships and study other cultures to a degree far greater than normally men and women in our services tend to do. Brigadier Lance Mans is the Deputy Director of the NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC). I would guess that a number of you in this room have never heard of this little organization. But from my perspective, having come to know it in the last year and a half, it's a fantastic organization. The director of the organization is an Air Force officer, Major General Frank Kisner, who is also our SOCEUR commander, as many of you know.

This little organization is not part of SHAPE's program element. It is an MOU framework nation, lead nation organization, the United States is the lead nation, but working very closely with our allies and friends—in particular our British allies as well as allies from Norway, Spain, Italy, Poland, France, Germany, and Denmark—to name a few—to build this organization into an operational entity. Last year, in 2009, NATO's Military Committee, under silence, decided that that the NSCC should become the core element of a NATO SOF headquarters (NSHQs) element. Lance is going to tell you much more about this organization, which is actually operational today in Afghanistan and is performing heroically with respect to kinetic and non-kinetic missions, including with respect to training and equipping our Afghan partners and the establishment of a novel intelligence fusion center in Kabul, which is sharing intelligence down to the operator level without all of the problems one traditionally endures when talking about classified material.

So Lance, I'm delighted that you are here. Thank you so much for taking the time.

[Applause]

Brigadier Mans' presentation. . . .

together the two sides of the debate to get responsible language in the strategic concept on cyber?

GENERAL ABRIAL: It is a very good question. [Laughter] I'm not surprised you asked it. My feeling is that, as contrary as to what had been proposed at the beginning, there is no question any more of modifying Article 5. The people who put together these very few words were very clever. We could never do better today. So my impression is that there will be no change in the wording of Article 5. The very important factor is that all nations have a common understanding of what it means, which I might argue is maybe not the case today.

The other aspect is: what exactly do we understand? Today we have these very easy words. Article 5 deals with an armed attack. What is an armed attack today? Even nations agree that a cyber attack could be considered as armed. If this is the case, then the logical deduction would be that that is how cyber should be considered within the framework of Article 5. But I don't know whether we can agree.

My feeling is that cyber is not brand new but a new domain, which has not been explored so far. That we have to deal with this phenomenon in ACT-- and its think tank is working hard on this question—is apparent. As an aviator I sometimes think that if you have a bunch of aircraft trying to attack you, it may be better to defeat them by cyber, rather than having to launch a counterforce and using kinetic weapons.

So in my very personal view, yes, cyber is central topic. Now, should it be recognized as an Article 5 issue, I think it is a more political decision.

DR. DAVIS: Thank you. Next question. Right there.

ROGER BRADY: Roger Brady, U.S. Air Forces Europe and Commander Air Component Command, Ramstein. Several of my NATO friends here might take a crack at this but General Abrial, who has discussed air command and control with me on

several occasions, will soon host a round of discussions on NATO's New Strategic Concept; it's my understanding, Stéphane, that they will include addressing any need for change in NATO organizations.

As we talk about things like the Allied Ground Surveillance System (AGS) that was mentioned by Brigadier Mans, the heavy airlift wing, a couple of other things that are going to happen, French reintegration—and, also, the latest new child on the block, which everyone is going to get very interested in is ballistic missile defense. Does this provide impetus for a discussion of the more unified air command and control structure? By the way, as most people know, none of these capabilities that I mentioned are part of the NATO air command system.

GENERAL ABRIAL: Thank you, but I should redirect any answer to that question to General Brady. But since he asked the question, I have a problem now. [Laughter] Well done, Roger! Yeah, we have to consider many possible changes ahead. You just mentioned, rightly, we will be co-hosting the fourth and last strategic concept seminar in Washington, D.C. at National Defense University (NDU) next month. And those issues you have been mentioning will be on the agenda. I don't know how the speakers who are going to be in the panels will talk of these issues. And I don't know yet, of course, what the group of experts will take from them, because these seminars are for their benefit (i.e., the Albright group of "wise persons"). Once they have heard the discussion from all of the seminars, and having deliberated on the issues, the Albright Group will issue a report to (NATO's) Secretary General on what should be the strategic concept.

On the "air" side, I do believe that we have a level of integration inside NATO, which is higher than other service components. It is probably due to the nature of our third dimension elements. But I also think that we can do better. I think that we need to integrate more. I think that we need to continue working on how to have flexible, reliable, deployable aspects of our air Command and control (C2) elements, on which we are working very hard as you know. We all work together. We need to have a vision,

which will help us face today's challenges in the air domain and prepare for tomorrow's challenges.

My personal experience is that the sooner we envisage all the possibilities to integrate, or at least to be able to have our forces interface with each other in the best possible effective, efficient, and cost effective manner, then we will be on the road to helping the Alliance nations make better progress with respect to national forces development and Allied interoperability. So I hope that these difficult questions will be raised and that we will find some answers next month. And, again, my very personal view will be in favor of more, much more interfacing and as much integration as possible.

DR. DAVIS: Air Vice-Marshal Hillier, do you want to say anything on these points, because the UK, of course, is very deeply involved in the NATO Strategic Concept discussion?

AIR VICE-MARSHAL HILLIER: While I'm not personally involved in those discussions, perhaps I can offer a personal view. And I touched on it a little bit in my presentation about command and control. From my perspective, making sure that command and control works for us, rather than us working for command and control, is imperative. In this context, I would suggest that future force development, especially in the C2 arena, must be based on what you need to get the job done rather than geography, for example. Finally, I believe that we need to make sure that command and control isn't judged as remote from the wars that we are in at the moment. So I think I would just simply say that, whatever we are looking for, it needs to be that agile, adaptable, and relevant for what we are doing. That is my personal view.

DR. DAVIS: Yes. There is a question here.

CAITLIN HARRINGTON: Hi. I'm Caitlin Harrington with *James Defense Weekly*. My question is for Commodore Steele and Vice-Marshal Hillier. There has been a lot of talk in the U.S. in the past few days about the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. It looks

like there is going to be some delay on flight-testing, which could impact the unit price of the early production orders of that aircraft. For Australia and the United Kingdom, in particular, I'm wondering if there is any concern about the unit cost going up? Will that affect how you are thinking about your purchases as you move forward?

DR. DAVIS: Stephen?

AIR VICE-MARSHAL HILLIER: Well, again, I mean I'm not familiar with all the detail of the UK's approach in the F-35 program. But clearly, as a major acquisition program for the UK it's of great relevance. I think what the UK would be looking for from F-35 is that it has got to be capable to do what we require it to do, to be adaptable. It's got to be able to fit the full spectrum of conflict and not be just a niche capability.

And it's got to be affordable. I think the affordability issue works in two ways. It's got to be value for money within the program itself. And it's got to be affordable in relation to defense priorities. And so where does the F-35 sit? Again, in the context of the UK's defense review, it will be considered, I'm sure, against those benchmarks of capable, adaptable and affordable. But I wouldn't pick F-35 out and say that, therefore, somehow it is a particularly special focus. Every part of UK defense has to be able to justify itself against those sort of parameters in any defense review. So I don't see it as an exceptional case.

DR. DAVIS: I guess, Stephen, you don't want to wade into the debate that occurred over the weekend, reported in the *Telegraph* and the *Guardian* between our good friend Mark Stanhope, First Sea Lord, and David Richards about aircraft carriers and what they may carry and how many there may be?

AIR VICE-MARSHAL HILLIER: No. Wade into a four-star debate? [Laughter] I will perhaps only tip my toe in rather than wade in. But I think I mentioned in my presentation, that there is a debate going on in the United Kingdom at the moment looking at this defense review. I think that is entirely healthy. And one of the key parts of

the debate is, what is the balance between high-, and low-end, capabilities? What are the most likely conflicts we will be in? What are the most dangerous conflicts? And what are the risks associated with taking particular courses of action.

And it is just an assessment of choices and risks, which will ultimately be political decisions. So I don't think that we should read in that the UK is going in a particular direction as a result of these speeches, which were made. It is simply a healthy debate as part of the run up to the defense review.

DR. DAVIS: Air Commodore Steele?

AIR COMMODORE STEELE: Thanks. I think the Australian government has taken a cautious approach to acquisition of JSF. It was timely, their decision to sign up to acquiring the first 14. And from the previous government as well, I think the hedging strategy of acquiring the 24 *Super Hornets* as a bridging air capability, combat capability is again, shows that cautious approach.

We, obviously, are very interested in the schedule and cost because our F-111s are going to be withdrawn as our classic *Hornet* fleet is getting old. We want to have a networked, truly fifth generation force early in this 21st century. So we are keeping ourselves apprised of the debate and decisions relevant to the JSF program, particularly as more information about schedule and costs become available.

DR. DAVIS: General Abrial, it is perhaps not fair but I'm going to exercise the prerogative of the Chair, again, to ask you a belated question, with respect to JSF. Because General Schwartz and the United States has a decision to make, which has to do with the nuclear capable variant, wiring the JSF to be nuclear capable, I wonder if you could say something about your thinking about the future of DCA deployments in Europe as you think about the changing deterrence landscape in Europe and globally?

GENERAL ABRIAL: Again, this is an issue, which is part of (NATO) Strategic Concept debate. And it is an issue, which will be dealt with next month, in and around the ACT/NDU seminar. I must say I have not studied this issue in great detail because it is not exactly in ACT's portfolio. The only experience I have is in my previous capacity (as the Chief of Staff of the French Air Force). I'm still somebody who thinks that we do need both visible (nuclear) commitments and capabilities in this field. And the link that we have established through the years is very important to the global position of the Alliance.

DR. DAVIS: Thank you. Next question. Yes. Right here.

General Kehler: Bob Kehler, the Commander of Air Force Space Command. And this is for the entire panel. We have long histories of collaboration between our forces, either bilateral or through our alliance relationships. I think each of you at some level mentioned about the importance of space to us, both operationally and in terms of our overall national security. Could you comment on where you see opportunities for us to collaborate? I know, General Abrial, you mentioned this specifically in your remarks.

But for each of you, could you comment on where we might have some opportunities to improve our cooperation, collaboration regarding space activities?

DR. DAVIS: General Hokazono, would you like to start?

GENERAL HOKAZONO: Thank you very much for your question. As you know, Japan is one of the leading countries of the space development. But mainly the responsibility is conducted by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology. And three years ago Japan established a law, the basic space law, which allows us to use space for the defense of the nation. So, it was the start for the Japan Self-Defense Force, to be involved to the space matters.

At this moment, in the Ministry Of Defense, we don't have a specific project. But as the Air Self-Defense Force, we have two main areas to develop. One is space communication. And the second is space surveillance. They haven't been funded officially yet, but we are studying those issues now. Regarding the cooperation with the United States at this moment, the MOD is thinking about sending personnel to your basic space education program in order to gain the knowledge from the United States about space activities. We will go forward step by step. Thank you.

DR. DAVIS: General Abrial, do you wish to add to that?

GENERAL ABRIAL: I can just say that space, as you know, is a very sensitive issue. Not everybody has a similar understanding of what we could or should do in space and the nations have various points of view—which is probably why NATO has not been further than it is today in this domain. It is one of the new domains on which ACT is working on very hard. It's always an issue, which is very close to sovereignty matters, displaying to others what type of capabilities you need, where and when you need to look at things. It can be very hard to share with others.

On the other hand, maybe communications could be easy to share because your very specific nation's devices can be on the ground somewhere and space could just be the vehicle to make sure that he gets the information he wants or needs. On that matter I think that it will be difficult to get unified a NATO position on space.

However, that said I see some future in multinational initiatives, like the NSCC, which has been briefed here, like the helicopter initiative, like the C-17 initiative—where some nations might want to share with each other, a few of these aspects as just mentioned. And this will also help smaller nations with smaller budgets to jump into the fray. Whereas alone they could never do so.

So I think that the way we should look at the issue is to try to find what are the areas in which groupings of nations in the Alliance could and seek to work together.

DR. DAVIS: Air Commodore Steele, do you want add to that?

AIR COMMODORE STEELE: Thank you. I guess ten years ago I would have said that neither, Australia, nor the Royal Australian Air Force, in particular, and the Australia Defense Force in general is a space force. But that would be patently wrong to say today. Now, though we don't actually put assets on orbit, we are inherently involved in the day-to-day business of the space game. When we think about space, I just think about it as a medium to conduct operations. That's all. It's an asset that we need to use.

The Chief of the Air Force in the Australian Defense Force is the coordinating capability manager for space. But space spreads across the whole spectrum of our defense force. We are investing in wideband global satellite, capabilities to go into orbit. So we are involved in that constellation. We are also involved in UHF SATCOM that is going over the Indian Ocean. And because of our relationship with the U.S. in particular, space is just another medium for sharing information.

We understand that there are opportunities for us to contribute to the situational awareness of and in space; that we all need to look out of our atmosphere into the other world ahead—as well as look down on the globe. And we believe there are some opportunities that Australia could contribute in the NASA environment as well.

DR. DAVIS: Thank you very much. Unless there is a last burning question—it remains to me to thank our panel members and close this session by showing our appreciation for the panel members and their remarks. .

[Applause]

END OF SESSION

