

DR. EHRHARD: Dave Ochmanek is going to demonstrate a revolution in briefing affairs by not using PowerPoint and Dave, I look forward to what you have to say about how we translate the kind of environment that General Deptula and General McDew talked about into a force mix.

DAVID A. OCHMANEK: Very good, it's a good challenge and I'll try to address it. General McDew very eloquently pointed out that we had a tectonic shift in geopolitics when the Soviet Union collapsed and we entered the post-Cold War era. I would argue today that we're on the threshold of the post post-Cold War era. The defining feature of the post-Cold War era was that the United States, when push came to shove, could soundly, resolutely decisively defeat any of its state adversaries. We got very good at it, and our forces are very well suited to it. Unfortunately, our adversaries didn't like it. Tom Ehrhard talked about the Air Force over its history not just adapting to and anticipating change, but helping shape the environment. We've shaped the environment, but not in entirely desired or anticipated ways. Our superiority in the conventional realm has driven adversaries to innovate in ways that are making life very difficult for us.

We're finding it a challenge to deal with irregular adversaries in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Yemen, in the international airport in Amsterdam. And pretty soon in places like the western Pacific, Korea, the Korean peninsula and the Persian Gulf we will also confront new, more challenging threats. And so as we plan the force, we have to anticipate the emergence of a set of challenges that are going to take us out of our comfort zone. And we do.

The force we have, as I said, is very well suited to the middle of the conflict spectrum where we can defeat an adversary state's military forces comprehensively. We have adversaries who are challenging us on the lower end of the spectrum; not lower in the sense of the degree of difficulty, but lower in the sense of the extent of organization of the adversary force. With insurgent tactics, with terrorism, with the need to bring stability to unstable areas that aren't governed.

We have non-state actors that are flying below the radar, quite literally, of our ability to detect and understand and counter them, and we have state adversaries building capabilities designed to

keep us out of their back yards, to suppress the operations of forces that we do deploy into their theater and to intimidate our allies and partners into denying us access to their air space, their facilities, their territory, and to coalitions.

The Secretary of Defense has emphasized repeatedly and vociferously the imperative of winning the conflicts we are in today. He does that for two reasons. One, because it's important to win the conflicts we're in today on their own merits. And two, because he is convinced, and I believe quite rightly so, that the challenge of insurgency, of terrorism, of stability of operations is not a transitory or anomalous feature of today's security environment. It is going to be with us for the foreseeable future. Irrespective of what happens to al-Qaeda, a long-term historical trend is that technologies of destruction are devolving to lower and lower forms of social organization. So smaller groups of people, are going to be able to pose greater threats to our society, to our people, to our way of life, to our interests.

And so while countering that threat is not solely a military mission, it is partly a military mission and we need to prepare for the long term to be engaged in countering these kinds of "irregular threats."

So we're taking a number of steps in the QDR to enhance our capabilities in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and other places where we're confronting insurgent threats. And we're also anticipating that those sorts of capabilities are going to be needed in the future and they're going to need to improve over time.

This doesn't necessarily mean we should anticipate an indefinite future in which U.S. forces are engaged on a large scale in fighting insurgents on other people's territories. Why? Because there are better ways to do this. Our preference, as General McDew suggested, is to act preventatively in partnership with others to enhance their capabilities and competence to provide security to their own people, to dry up these ungoverned and under - governed territories, not with American boots on the ground, but with competent local forces on the ground.

Immediately after 9/11, the Air Force came to Rand, where I was working then, and General Jumper, who was the Chief of Staff, said, "I need to know what this means for the United States Air Force. Throw out your research agenda for fiscal year 2002 and tell me what this means for the Air Force." I worked on the strategy piece of that task and I immediately started reading the insurgency literature from the 1950s. And the big lessons that came out of that were that terrorism, like insurgency is a weapon of the weak insurgents relies on stealth to avoid confrontations with security forces because they cannot succeed when they openly confront security forces. Terrorist are the same way. The lessons from successful counterinsurgencies of the '50s and '60s are that counterinsurgents win when they find ways to keep the adversary under constant pressure without at the same time alienating the population and creating more insurgents. Hard to do. It's information intensive, it relies on great care in the application of fire power and military force, but it can be done, it has been done, and we're trying to apply that model to the global insurgency called the al-Qaeda terrorist network.

That means working with others, with partner states, to make them more effective at providing security to their own people. The strategy works. We've done it in the Philippines. The father of the Philippine operation, I don't want to embarrass him, is sitting here, Lt General Donny Wurster. He did a brilliant job of defining a campaign that has succeeded in very dramatically improving security in Mindanao in the southern, Muslim dominated areas of the Philippines without offending the Philippine sense of sovereignty and national pride. Working behind the scenes with and through the Philippine armed forces to help them do a better job with their mission. But you don't do this on the fly. You need expertise, you need specialized capabilities to do it properly.

Let me say just a few words about the "high end" threat. There are those who characterize this Secretary and this QDR as focused solely on irregular warfare; that is inaccurate. The leadership of the Department of Defense has a keen appreciation for the fact that state adversaries still pose important threats to the United States. And those threats are dynamic. Programmed forces in many cases will be ill suited to dealing with threats posed by states like a nuclear-armed North Korea, like China as it continues to field more anti-access capabilities, and what you see in both of these cases is the emergence of contested and denied environments; things we used to take for

granted are now called into question. The idea that forward-deployed forces and bases would be essentially in sanctuary from enemy attack, which is really part of the foundation of our concept for power projection, is now no longer viable as we look five and ten years into the future.

The idea that our space constellations won't come under kinetic and non-kinetic attack, that our information networks won't be subjected to cyber attacks, that the air defenses our forces will confront, will continue to be 1960s era air defenses, a la Iraq and Serbia, all of these sort of implicit assumptions that many people have a sense of complacency about are now no longer valid. And so, these are the components of the post post-Cold War security environment. Just a few words on what this means for the Air Force going forward.

As we look at the demands of counterinsurgency, stability ops and counterterrorism, one of the things that shines through the analysis is the importance of getting more enablers in the hands of commanders and troops in the field. They need more rotary wing lift, they need more ISR. They need more situational awareness and ISR not just in the hardware sense, but in the analysis, the synthesis, the rapid dissemination of information down to the platoon level.

Inter and intra-theater lift, long dwell precision fire support, robust communications networks: These sorts of things, which the Secretary likes to call enablers, are the war winners for us. And we need more of them, and you're going to see a continued emphasis on that.

For security force assistance missions, the Air Force is looking seriously, to its great credit, at fielding what I call "partner-appropriate" platforms. The Philippine air force probably shouldn't be flying F-16s, but air power can be an important component of their ability to bring security to their populations. And if the Air Force can work at their level with partner appropriate air frames, they can make a much bigger contribution to this critical mission.

We need people who speak foreign languages, who are comfortable operating in foreign cultures, who want to go back repeatedly to the same place, who will maintain personal relationships with their counterparts as they grow from captains to majors to colonels to generals. And we need to manage the career paths of people who specialized in SFA so that that's not a dead end for

people's careers. We need more base operating support things like force protection, deployable communications, logistics, intra-theater lift, again, so that forces operating for prolonged periods in austere environments can do their jobs. Often, we kind of improvise with these things out of hide, we do catch as catch can, but the balance between our overall shooter force structure and these below the line things may not be appropriate for this post-Cold War environment.

Finally, successfully confronting the challenges of anti-access capabilities is going to require a new concept of operations for power projection. We're not going to invent that overnight. The effort to define a new Air/sea battle CONOPs is going on, again to the great credit of the Air Force. But will be some time before our thinking coheres around a new concept. In the meantime, we probably all have a sense of the kinds of things that are necessary to make that concept work; things like a more resilient base structure in areas of the world threatened by anti-access capabilities. Again, our bases are not going to be in sanctuary from enemy attack.

We must anticipate heavy jamming attacks on SATCOM, in some cases kinetic attacks on communications and other space-based constellations. We probably need airborne adjuncts to those space-based assets in the absence of a concept to make those space-based assets fully survivable. U.S. forces will also require more survivable ISR platforms that can do their job in the presence of advanced air defenses, more survivable long-range strike assets, some combination of standoff and penetrating platforms so that we can continue to observe, track, engage and destroy critical war fighting assets to an enemy that's protected by layers of offensive and defensive capability.

And finally, we need the capability to hold at risk enemies with nuclear weapons. In particular, when we think about regional adversaries with small numbers of nuclear weapons, this nation needs to be able to credibly threaten them with with retaliatory options that can be developed quickly, flexibly in the presence of unanticipated situations, and delivered in small numbers, low yields, to have a credible retaliatory option. And I'll stop there and leave the rest for questions, thank you. [applause]

well as the distributed common ground station analytic back end piece. A perfect match that will truly take us to the next level of total force integration.

DR. EHRHARD: Thanks, sir. Another question? Go ahead.

AUDIENCE: Sky Forrester from the Eisenhower Center of Space and Defense Studies at the Air Force Academy. Couple of references to commercialization, particularly as it relates to space. The reality is, as you all know, a substantial percentage of our capability, information flows, communications, comes from non-U.S. government assets in space, commercialization. To what extent is the commercial sector part of this consideration of what our own space assets ought to be, or are we still predominantly thinking about DOD and Air Force space assets and kind of leaving that to fend for itself? The thousand ship Navy is a bad metaphor, but there may be something-- there's some element of that that might be interesting to pursue. I'd be interested in your comments.

DR. EHRHARD: I can say the space posture review is another one of the reviews that we're sort of waiting to come out. But I do know they've addressed that and we don't really have the right people up here, perhaps, to deal directly with that question. But it always has been a part of how we think about space and the difficulty is that it changes over time. For a while there, it looked like there wasn't going to be a lot of capacity in space toward the end of the '90s. Some of the systems, Iridium, et cetera, were not very successful. So it makes it a very difficult planning challenge to understand just how much capacity is going to be out there. Now we see private, commercial companies getting into even some pretty high fidelity imagery-type work. So there can be no question that just like in aviation, air power is a larger part of both military and commercial and civil. The same thing applies to space.

I will just say this. Once again, when you start talking about force mix, you have to ask in an era of such constrained resources and the different kinds of challenges that all the speakers talked about here, you have to ask yourself, what is your core capability? What are really the things that you have to have in the U.S. military? And some of the challenges that were talking about here are not easy ones. They have to do with the fact that there's going to be growing challenges to

unfettered access and exploitation of space. So there is no doubt about the fact that this, it's changing rapidly, what the composition of those space assets are. But we have to ask serious questions about when you fall back and you're dealing with a bandwidth constrained environment, for instance. What are those pieces that we have to have as military assets up there that do specific jobs for us and going forward the space mix?

Let me just add one other challenge to that. General Deptula deals with ISR every day. And there are huge issues dealing with the space and air mix, as well, and how we hedge against a future, more contested environment in both domains and how we balance those two capabilities. So there's no question about the fact that commercial assets are being used today. They're a critical part of all those predator caps and reaper caps that we're running every day, those commercial bandwidth paths. And so they've just become a part of the way we do business, and I don't think that's going to change in the near future.

I want to get off the stage now, we have Secretary Carter, is going to be speaking to you in a minute. I want to thank the speakers again for their words today, and hope we gave you something to think about when it comes to the future force mix for the Air Force. Thank you very much.

END OF SESSION III